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Abstract
The study of the health workforce has gained in prominence in recent years, as the dynamic
interconnections between human resource issues and health system effectiveness have come into
sharper focus. This paper reviews lessons relating to strategic management challenges emerging
from the growing literature in this area. Workforce issues are strategic: they affect overall system
performance as well as the feasibility and sustainability of health reforms. Viewing workforce issues
strategically forces health authorities to confront the yawning gaps between policy and
implementation in many developing countries.
Lessons emerge in four areas. One concerns imbalances in workforce structure, whether from a
functional specialization, geographical or facility lens. These imbalances pose a strategic challenge
in that authorities must attempt to steer workforce distribution over time using a limited range of
policy tools. A second group of lessons concerns the difficulties of central-level steering of the
health workforce, often critically weak due to the lack of proper information systems and the
complexities of public sector decentralization and service commercialization trends affecting the
grassroots.
A third cluster examines worker capacity and motivation, often shaped in developing countries as
much by the informal norms and incentives as by formal attempts to support workers or to hold
them accountable. Finally, a range of reforms centering on service contracting and improvements
to human resource management are emerging. Since these have as a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition some flexibility in personnel practices, recent trends towards the sharing of such
functions with local authorities are promising.
The paper identifies a number of current lines of productive research, focusing on the relationship
between health policy reforms and the local institutional environments in which the workforce,
both public and private, is deployed.
Review
Having long suffered "woeful neglect," [1] the study of the
health workforce is enjoying increased interest in recent
years, to judge by the growing range of research being con-
ducted across a variety of sub-fields. This paper plumbs
recent work on the health workforce for insights into one
of its important, though often implicit, cross-cutting
themes: the need for, and current weaknesses in, the stra-
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tegic management of the health workforce in developing
countries. After exploring the nature of 'strategic' manage-
ment in the health sector, I group ten lessons into four
areas: workforce structure, the 'steering' of the workforce,
drivers of behavior at the facility level and approaches to
improving the performance of human resources. The
paper also sketches questions likely to preoccupy
researchers in this area in the coming years.
What is 'strategic' about the health workforce?
One conclusion of a growing number of case studies and
policy analyses of the health workforce concerns the stra-
tegic nature of health workforce issues, in several senses.
The workforce, arguably the most important input to any
health system, has a strong impact on overall health sys-
tem performance [2,3]. Health sectors in developing
countries have faced a wide variety of systemic pressures
in recent years. Although the specifics vary by country set-
ting, these have often included pressures towards marketi-
zation of health services [4], civil service restructuring [5],
decentralization [6,7] and an overall trend towards
increasing geographical and socioeconomic disparities in
many countries. The feasibility and sustainability of
reforms introduced in these systems relies heavily on the
level of 'buy-in' and well-being of health sector personnel
at all levels. As West put it in her review of the National
Health System in Britain: "The quality of patient care may
be related in an important way to the quality of life expe-
rienced by staff at work" [8].
The health workforce is also strategic in that almost any
type of desired reform outcome depends on specific
changes in workforce behavior throughout the system, and
such behavior is profoundly affected by a range of factors
that are not directly under the control of central and local
authorities. Understanding and changing negative phe-
nomena at the local level – such as illegal user charges or
drug overprescription – depends on an understanding of
the effective incentives faced by grassroots service provid-
ers. Studying how health personnel are likely to respond
to new rules, roles, responsibilities and resources is thus
essential for gauging the feasibility of reform interven-
tions.
'Strategic' management implies a more coordinated, sys-
tematic policy approach to the workforce based on a clear
situation analysis and linked to at least a medium-term
vision of desired outcomes for the health sector as a whole
[9,10]. Constraints on strategic management, which is
both capacity- and strategy-intensive, often stem in devel-
oping country settings from particularly short policy hori-
zons and weak implementation capacities [11,12].
While the literature on the health workforce is still poorly
developed in relation to other aspects of health care, a
range of case studies in recent years has yielded valuable
insights regarding patterns and challenges of strategic
management in the sector. Ten lessons stand out.
Structural aspects of the health workforce
1. Imbalances in workforce structure are both a symptom of 
underlying problems and a cause of poor health system performance
Several recent studies have cast new light on the 'old'
problem of imbalances in the health workforce [13-16].
One contribution has been to systematic categories of
imbalances, including:
•  Overall supply/demand: In theory, workforce numbers
should be determined by specific objectives set by policy-
makers for the health sector and by the demand for health
services. In practice, a number of factors – such as varia-
tions in the historical production of the workforce, and
the long time lag between training and deployment of
health personnel – can intervene. It is commonly thought
that the public health sectors of many countries suffer
from a surplus of workers who are not particularly pro-
ductive; hence a focus in a number of countries on down-
sizing the labor force.
• Profession/specialty: Imbalances in this area concern the
distribution of doctors, nurses, paraprofessionals and
other health personnel. One generalization from the pub-
lic health literature is that systems often underinvest in the
production of paraprofessionals, nurses and assistant doc-
tors relative to the expensive education of doctors [16].
• Geographic: Developing countries are often said to suffer
from 'urban bias' – a situation in which the political and
economic forces of a country reinforce provision of serv-
ices and investments in urban areas, reinforcing dispari-
ties in access to health services and in health outcomes
[17]. This can also influence the distribution of health
personnel away from rural and remote areas that tend to
be poorer. However, there may be a tension between con-
centrating staff in more densely populated areas (which
may be better off) as opposed to poorer remote areas. This
reflects a broader trade-off often encountered between
equity and efficiency in health care.
• Institutional imbalances: These include the question of
how to deploy staff between curative and preventive func-
tions of the health sector, as well as their distribution at
various tiers and facilities of the system [13].
• Public/private imbalance: Most systems have some mix of
public and private personnel, and countries are arrayed
somewhere along a continuum in terms of their distribu-
tion among these poles. To imply that there is an imbal-
ance is to say that some important function of the health
system is being underperformed because of the distribu-Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:4 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/4
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tion of personnel along this pole. A typical example
would be public health missions that are suffering from a
lack of trained personnel or resources [14].
• Gender and ethnic imbalances: Since the Alma Ata summit
which gave a major boost to the concept of primary health
care, a key idea has been that the health sector should be
democratic, and the health personnel should be repre-
sentative of the population. An imbalance in this area
would suggest that workforce demographics fail to reflect
important variations (in ethnicity or gender) of the client
populations, with the implication that such populations
are being underserved [13].
The notion of "workforce imbalance" is a subjective
appraisal; there is no inherent equilibrium point for any
of the variables above. That will depend on context, objec-
tives and values. The broader, strategic issue concerns the
means health authorities have at their disposal for inter-
vening in order to affect workforce imbalances. Such
means are often considerably weaker than authorities
realize, not least due to an overreliance on administrative
norms and centrally dictated quotas for workforce pro-
duction and deployment, often badly out of alignment
with transitioning, decentralizing countries [18].
Shifting roles of the center and local governments in health 
workforce issues
The issue of the health workforce is complex partly
because of the great number of actors and stakeholders
involved. Much of the literature on the workforce deals
with the issue of the mix of roles and responsibilities
between different levels of government, which have been
in some transition due to decentralization.
2. Capacities for strategic workforce planning in Ministries of Health 
are often critically weak
Information systems relating to the workforce are typi-
cally sketchy [19], and planning is technical rather than
strategic in nature, [20] for instance leaving "key ques-
tions about the distribution, qualifications, motivation,
development, and performance of staff unexplored." [21]
One consequence of this is that central-level steering of
the health workforce and the behavior of personnel at
local levels is often surprisingly weak, as noted above
[5,22]. If the primary instruments employed by the central
level to steer the health system are laws, regulations and
administrative norms, the literature notes large gaps
between policy and local implementation. A study of
China's health sector highlights the "difficulties involved
in efforts to influence provider behavior through a
national level legislative framework in a situation of
decentralization of control over those providers, due to
extreme regional variation in economic situations and
limited resource inputs from the centre" [23]. Such diffi-
culties are highlighted when, as in China, only some 30%
of health worker salaries is paid by the central government
[23].
The balancing act Ministries of Health must walk is
between being overly prescriptive (and thus developing
rules that are inappropriate for particular local condi-
tions) and issuing guidelines too general to be of use.
Where the policy-implementation gap is overcome, it is
usually due to the development of "specific guidelines
developed by organizations of health professionals or
other advisory bodies" for the implementation of health
laws and policies "to bridge the gap between legal theory
and everyday practice" [24].
3. Provinces can potentially play an important role in human resource 
management, but they are often constrained by overly centralized 
health systems
The ability of provinces and local governments in general
to contract, hire, promote and fire human resources is a
major determinant of the flexibility of any health system
and on the viability efforts to promote improved respon-
siveness (the "short route to accountability", in the World
Bank's phrase [25]) between local service providers and
the end users of services.
Yet, as suggested by Table 1, taking several countries in
East and Southeast Asia as a sample, control over hiring
and firing of workers is rather limited in a number of
countries, even those with fairly advanced stages of decen-
tralization (such as Indonesia and the Philippines). Some
countries in which donors play a strong role (as in Cam-
bodia) have introduced greater flexibility in local govern-
ment contracting of health staff, something that "provides
the opportunity for signatories to negotiate mutually
agreed activities, funding and outputs for specific health
programmes" [20]. Yet decentralization of such powers
can lead to health workforce "fragmentation", and can
pose a "threat to workers' well-being" if it negatively
affects (as in Uganda) professionalism, career mobility
and the timeliness of salary payments" [27]. Thus some
analysts point towards a "tension between the objective of
increasing efficiency and local government autonomy, on
the one hand, and the quality and equity benefits of a uni-
form national service cadre with vertical mobility, on the
other" [6].
Worker capacity, motivation, and performance
The academic literature on the workforce focuses much
attention onto the linkages between the conditions in
which health personnel work and their performance. One
useful way of thinking about how to boost workforce
capacity to perform at a high level is to think of what the
workforce 'can do' (what skills and training enables peo-
ple to do) and what the workforce 'will do' (feels moti-Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:4 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/4
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vated and empowered to do). Such an institutional
analysis is essential to understanding policy implementa-
tion gaps in the sector.
4. On the 'can do' side, workers are often unprepared to take on 
their new functions in more complex systems, especially when these 
systems are decentralizing
Typical training of health personnel emphasizes factual,
specialist medical knowledge. But much of what public
personnel actually must do to fulfil their functions
involves higher-order analysis, supervision and inspec-
tion, coordination across multiple actors (including both
local authorities and communities) and a range of mana-
gerial tasks [21]. Table 2 gives one example of tasks
assigned typically to district-level health managers. The
literature notes that district managers, in particular, feel
and in reality are poorly supported in many of these func-
tions. District health managers are often found to be par-
ticularly weak in systems management (community
involvement and intersectoral co-operation), monitoring
activities and the systematic organization of meetings.
One study notes that district managers are "rarely
involved in the identification of priority health problems
or of high-risk groups, and fail to use health service indi-
cators sufficiently for the analysis of the district health sys-
tem" [28].
Part of the complexity of the managerial environments in
which health personnel must function comes from the
multiple sources of accountability to which they are sub-
ject [27]. Managers and personnel at the grassroots must
balance the demands of "those responsible for specific
policies, such as reproductive health policies, and those
responsible for managing the integrated delivery of all
policies, with their resultant contestations over authority
and resources" [29]. They must also manage the increas-
ing commercialization of services that is an important fea-
ture of many developing country health sectors [4,30].
5. On the "will do" side of worker motivation, the literature 
emphasizes the importance of considering a broad range of factors 
that affect worker motivation
These can be understood in terms of metaphorical 'day-
light' and 'shadow-side' factors, distinguished by the
degree to which they are amenable to intervention by the
health authorities (and easily accessible to researchers).
Both obvious "daylight" factors such as worker terms of
service and managerial supervision can affect worker
motivation and behaviour; but the hidden or 'shadow'
side of organizational life and worker motivation must
also be recognized (see figure 1). It includes the value sets
of workers (which are influenced both by professional
norms, social ideas about the professional roles workers
are playing and by the broader organizational culture of
the civil service).
The shadow side also includes the availability of liveli-
hood strategies and alternatives. Whether health workers
are 'over-' or 'under-paid,' relative to some external stand-
ard – and debate on how to approach this issue continues
Table 1: Sub-national influence in human resource management in East Asia
Domain Cambodia China Indonesia Philippines Thailand Vietnam
Budget control
• Determine the wage envelope * * * ** * *
• Dismiss surplus staff ** ** *** *
Establishment control
• Control overall staffing numbers * ** * ** * *
• Control staffing numbers in individual facilities ** ** *** **
Recruitment
• Formal employer *** *** * *** ** *
• Have authority to hire ** *** ** *** * ***
• Have independent recruitment mechanism * ** ** * * *
Career management
• Promotion is available * ** ** *** * *
• Transfers within local government are possible * * *** *** * **
Performance management
• Direct and supervise activities *** *** ** *** *** ***
• Conduct evaluations * *** ** *** * *
• Offer financial rewards * * ** ** * **
• Discipline and fire underperforming staff * * ** ** * **
Pay policy
• Set overall wage rates * * * * * *
• Set local incentives/salary top-ups ** *** ** *** * **
*** = full; ** = partial; * = no subnational control, focusing on the strongest subnational level of government for each country. Data underlying the 
assessment range from 2000 – 2005.
Source: adapted from table 7.3 in [26] supplemented by author's estimates for Vietnam.Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:4 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/4
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in the literature [31] – is not the sole point. Rather, health
workers, like all other workers will gauge the need and
possibility of earning additional income (including any
risks associated with it) when considering the effort they
put into discharging their official responsibilities. Of
course, the shadow and daylight sides are interlinked:
...confirmation and even salary are forms of recognition as
well as ways of satisfying lower order needs such as sur-
vival and security. But environmental factors may affect
which order (lower level survival needs or higher level
desire for recognition) is most prominent. The poorer the
satisfaction of basic terms of service factors, the less likely
higher order incentives are to be central [32].
6. On both "can" and "will do" measures, the institutional 
environments in which many health workers work can be more 
disabling than enabling
Incentives for positive performance of the health work-
force are reported to be very weak across a range of devel-
oping country health sectors, both from the 'daylight' and
'shadow' sides of the health facility environment.
On the 'daylight' side, workers may feel they have little to
gain from working hard or being responsive to either their
clients or superiors. Poor career paths and promotion
opportunities lead to health workers feeling 'stuck', while
official salaries often cover only part of a worker's needs or
overall income (given alternative livelihood strategies,
Factors affecting worker motivation and behavior Figure 1
Factors affecting worker motivation and behavior.
Health worker 
motivation and 
behavior
Terms of service – job 
security, salary 
Managerial goal setting, 
performance management   Career prospects, 
opportunities for growth 
Strength of professional 
ethics, social expectations 
Informal organizational 
culture and expectations 
Alternative sources of 
income 
‘Shadow’ aspects 
‘Daylight’ aspects 
Table 2: Common tasks of district-level health managers
Task category Examples
Needs assessment and planning Analysis of context, health, health service and priority setting
Resource management Human resources (selection, team management and communication, management of conflict, financial resources, 
facilities management (drugs, acquisition and maintenance of equipment), supervision of grassroots health 
workers
Systems management Dissemination and interpretation of new health policies; development of practical implementation guidelines or 
measures for local area Intrasectoral collaboration (including referral systems) Intersectoral collaboration (e.g. 
between health facilities and schools) Social mobilization and community participation Regulation/coordination 
with private sector providers to address unexpected problems or regular campaigns
Monitoring and evaluation Quality assurance, inspections, regular reporting to upper levels
Source: Adapted from [28]Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:4 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/4
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such as engaging in part-time private sector health services
or entirely different informal occupations) [33].
Also on the 'daylight' side, a range of functions related to
both performance management (by which is meant the
systematic communication of job expectations followed
by regular performance reviews) and strategic personnel
planning ("the creation of new types of jobs, re-profiling
of old ones or the addition or abolishing of staff positions
in accordance with need") [34] – is found to be weak or
typically non-existent [35]. The Cambodian case is typi-
cal: "sub-national units have no effective system of per-
formance management for individuals or work units with
no system for linking individual performance to the goals
and functions of the organization or for rewarding appro-
priate initiatives and behaviour"[20]. Part of the reason
performance management is rare in public services in
developing countries is that "its prerequisites (such as a
living wage for health workers, and the availability to
them of drugs, equipment and transport) are often miss-
ing" [34]. When the health sector is severely underre-
sourced it is difficult to hold people accountable for how
they do their jobs. Also, workers often feel disempowered
by the narrow range of authority they are granted in con-
ducting their jobs and by their lack of consultation regard-
ing major reform efforts affecting their jobs. Even in
systems undergoing significant administrative decentrali-
zation, there is often a disjunction between formal
responsibilities and requisite resources to meet minimum
specified standards – a classic recipe for workforce frustra-
tion and for the failure of decentralization reforms [36].
The 'shadow' side of organizations is also often found to
undermine morale in the health sector. The informal
norms and work ethics of frontline civil servants in more
remote localities can be oriented more towards alternative
livelihood strategies and "muddling through" than they
are towards high standards of service delivery [27]. A sense
of professionalism can be difficult to maintain especially
in remote areas, particularly where staff feel the commit-
ment of central and local authorities to the sector, and
social expectations regarding their performance, are weak
[37].
7. The collective impact of weak institutional environments at the 
facility level can be a strong determinant of health sector 
performance
Studies note that even in well-resourced facilities, doctor
training and experience tend to be weakly correlated with
the quality of care provided, which is taken by analysts to
mean,
... not that physicians are unimportant for quality but that
organisational context is far more important in setting
limits (upper and lower) for physicians than formerly rec-
ognised. Medical staff organisation– including peer
review, selection and continued review of new staff mem-
bers, and participation in policy making committees–
have also been shown to be positively related to quality of
patient care [8].
Approaches to boosting workforce performance
8. Despite the difficulties noted above, the literature identifies a 
number of characteristics of high-performing health facilities and 
personnel
Such organizations share the following characteristics
[38].
• A strong sense of mission and sense of commitment to
that mission by staff.
• A relatively high level of prestige and social status
accorded to those who work in the organization.
• A culture oriented towards results both individually and
organizationally. All members of the group are evaluated
against performance objectives regularly and are expected,
both by managers and by co-workers, to pull their weight;
and the organization itself constantly evaluates its per-
formance against external objectives and benchmarks.
• Lines of feedback from the end users of services are open
and actively used to improve service delivery.
What is striking in the literature is the notion that organi-
zational culture can be as critical as the direct monetary
incentives of the workforce [39]. While pay and job secu-
rity are clearly important determinants of morale, many
organizations in developing countries have been able to
significantly improve performance by cultivating a partic-
ipatory, open, performance-oriented culture in which the
workforce is deployed.
The literature also stresses that allowing "some autonomy
in personnel matters" is an essential facilitative condition
for developing the organizational performance culture
noted above [38]. A review of high-performing public
organizations in developing countries found that they
enjoyed autonomy to "identify positions, advertise for
candidates, establish routines for hiring people to fill
positions, promote people on the basis of organization-
ally defined standards and priorities, and punish those
who did not meet these standards" [38]. Recent trends
towards the sharing of some personnel management func-
tions with local authorities and facility managers (as
shown in Table 1) are promising in this regard, although
a number of enabling factors will be necessary to support
and reorient such functions [26].Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:4 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/4
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There is no doubt that it is possible to improve health sec-
tor performance in developing countries using these
reform approaches, as attested by several documented
case studies [11]. However, the health sector has some
special challenges that make it important to apply reform
efforts with care, as attested in the final two points
addressing popular approaches to health sector reform.
9. Decentralization is no panacea for the health sector; it will not 
strengthen accountability and performance unless factors supporting 
high performance are put into place
Decentralization has been in vogue in developing coun-
tries for over two decades, but there is no evidence in the
growing literature on health sector decentralization that
decentralization reliably increases sector performance
[6,40]. A review of TB control in Nepal concludes that
decentralization
...can lead to inequity, political manipulation, fragmenta-
tion, increased bureaucratic costs and the overall weaken-
ing of the public sector...and affects the incentives and
career prospects of health staff. This complexity raises seri-
ous questions regarding the 'why', 'what' and 'how' of
decentralisation [41].
The important lesson in managing the process of health
sector decentralization is "to ensure that the newly
empowered organization is required to deliver clearly
identifiable and measurable objectives. At the same time
the organization is given the necessary resources and dis-
cretion over their use, to permit these objectives to be
met" [42]. The conceptual shift that is required is to exam-
ine what approaches and parts of decentralization work in
which local contexts, and to adjust the decentralizing
reform to match this [36].
10. Approaches to improving performance that focus on increasing 
competitive pressures on health facilities run the risk of undermining 
core public health functions and values
The curative and preventive sides of public service provi-
sion typically cannot be delinked; the incentives of pro-
viders who often must attend to both sets of functions are
affected by increasing pressures in the area of curative care
[17]. It is in general hypothesized in the literature that
'what gets measured gets done', and even more so 'what
gets paid gets done'; thus, if the material incentives shift
towards curative health provision, it is likely that manage-
rial and staff attention will be focused there as well. An
overemphasis on revenue generation often leads to
declining access by the poor as well as overproduction of
health services. This effect may be particularly pro-
nounced in transition settings such as China and Vietnam
[18,30,43,44]; one case study in China found that the
introduction of output-related bonuses for doctors
increased "unnecessary care," drug sales and inpatient
admission rates [45].
Moreover, in most countries the curative and preventive
sides of health financing are linked in multiple ways. For
example, in a decentralized, commercialized health sec-
tor, implementation support for preventive functions may
be increasingly financed out of local government budgets
(which can vary dramatically) or even facility-level reve-
nues [43]. This may accentuate disparities between facili-
ties that are capable of such supplementation and those
that are not.
Competitive pressures may be part of the reform mix. The
move to contract out service provision, even for preven-
tive health functions such as health information, to pro-
viders who are paid on the basis of concrete outputs and
outcomes is one example of a promising approach [46].
But taken as a whole the literature can hardly be said to be
optimistic.
Conclusion
Figure 2 lays out some of the central components of
research concerning the strategic management of health
workers in developing countries. It highlights core dimen-
sions of workforce issues, corresponding roughly to three
types of policy instruments that health policymakers have
at their disposal to manage the workforce 'strategically':
• Structural issues such as the recruitment and distribu-
tion of workers (policy instruments: direct investment in
the production of the workforce and regulations govern-
ing their distribution);
• Management and motivation issues (policy instru-
ments: organizational reforms, management and supervi-
sory patterns and workforce terms of service); and
• Private sector environment (policy instruments: regula-
tion and standard setting).
In addition to emphasizing this menu of policy choices,
the framework is meant to highlight the external factors
that impact on actual performance. 'External', from a
health policymakers' perspective, includes both policies
that originate from outside the sector – such as decentral-
ization and public administration reform – and changing
social expectations and development levels and patterns,
including increased disparities throughout a country. The
combined effect of these factors, including on that upon
the workforce, leads to overall health sector performance,
which eventually leads to particular health impacts
(although these are not directly addressed here). Ideally,
the system should be able to learn over time how to adjust
policies and projects to achieve a more positive impact.Human Resources for Health 2007, 5:4 http://www.human-resources-health.com/content/5/1/4
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Important questions on which some productive areas of
current research on strategic workforce management are
likely to continue can be situated in the figure. For exam-
ple:
• What kinds of impacts are environmental and policy
changes originating outside the sector having on the
health workforce?
• What do these changes imply for effectiveness of differ-
ent mechanisms and interventions employed by health
authorities to steer and coordinate workforce issues?
• How can the health sector take advantage and avoid the
risks of public sector decentralization trends? How will
the roles of the central-level authorities in workforce man-
agement be changing in this process?
• How can we assess facility-level determinants of motiva-
tion and high performance, including the impact of vari-
ous types of accountability mechanisms, in order to
influence workforce motivation in ways that can be
implemented in highly resource-constrained environ-
ments?
• What effect are private sector forces having on the set of
incentives of the public health workforce? Furthermore,
how can the private sector workforce itself be more effec-
tively regulated and made to synergize to the maximum
extent possible with that of the public sector?
Three additional aspects of the figure deserve mention.
First, policymakers control some but not all of the levers
necessary to improve health sector performance. In addi-
tion to policies, the broader institutional environment
affecting local service delivery is important to consider.
Second, policies can have both intended and unintended
consequences on the workforce. For instance, efforts to
increase competitive pressures by boosting managerial
and financial autonomy of facilities can have unintended
side-effects on workforce performance; these are impor-
tant to analyze. Finally, the impacts of any health sector
reform in large, heterogeneous countries are likely to be
mixed, and a key focus of health analysts should be on the
attempt to explain the resulting patterns.
Efforts to study the health workforce will likely continue
to gain in prominence, and are likely to figure more prom-
inently in the next ten years than they have in recent dec-
Dimensions of health workforce research Figure 2
Dimensions of health workforce research.
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ades. Within the growing number of case studies and
analytical reviews, the issue of what makes for effective
strategic  management of the health workforce deserves
continued attention, particularly in developing country
settings.
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